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ABSTRACT 
SOUTH ATLANTIC FISHERY STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS OF CATCH 
SHARES: A THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT COMMENTS 
 
Christina Marie Wiegand, B.S., University of North Carolina Wilmington 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
Chairperson: Tatyana Ruseva 
How to effectively manage fisheries has been a topic of much debate throughout 
the academic literature. Recently, many academics and fisheries’ managers have called 
for the implementation of catch share programs, a market-based solution to fisheries 
management. While many fishery councils in the United States have successfully 
implemented these programs, the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council (SAFMC) 
has struggled. In order to better understand how stakeholders in the South Atlantic feel 
about catch shares, a thematic analysis was conducted using comments submitted to 
SAFMC concerning three separate catch share amendments. The study results revealed 
that majority of the stakeholders who were financially invested in the fisheries (fishermen 
and industry workers) were overwhelmingly against the catch share amendments. On the 
other hand, nonprofits were consistently in support of catch share amendments. Those 
against catch shares discussed the potential impacts on the economy and the lack of data, 
whereas those in support of catch shares more frequently discussed environmental 
impacts. This thesis concludes that SAFMC could benefit from increased communication 
with stakeholders and collaborative research initiatives. 
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Introduction 
 The struggle to find a successful way to manage natural resources is nothing new 
to policy makers, resource managers, and resource users. The management of fish stocks 
is no exception to this rule; and as more research is conducted, it is becoming more and 
more apparent that strong and successful management techniques are going to be 
necessary to prevent the collapse of the world’s fisheries. The United Nations’ Food and 
Agriculture Organization report on the State of the World’s Fisheries and Aquaculture 
found that half of the world’s fisheries are fully exploited, and another quarter of the 
world’s fisheries are overexploited or severely depleted. The numbers don’t look much 
better in the South Atlantic region of the United States, which includes North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, and Eastern Florida. According to the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Fish Stock Sustainability Index (FSSI), as of 
June of 2012, five species in the South Atlantic are overfished, while eight species, 
including three species already overfished, are currently experiencing overfishing 
(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 2012)1.  
 The fishing industry, as in many other parts of the world, is an important 
component of the coastal communities in the South Atlantic, providing not only jobs for 
commercial fishermen but also jobs for fish processors and dealers, boat sales and 
repairmen, and those involved in the tourism industry such as dive shops and charter boat 
                                                          
1 NOAA considers a fish stock overfished when it drops below the minimum stock size and management is 
necessary to rebuild the stock to its Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). NOAA defines overfishing as 
occurring when a fish stock or complex is experiencing a rate of fishing or fish mortality that prevents it 
from producing the MSY. 
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owners. Between 2007 and 2009, commercial fishermen in the South Atlantic landed 108 
million pounds of fish and shellfish, amounting to $151 million dollars in revenue to the 
coastal community. Recreational fishing also has quite an impact on the region with 84 
million fish caught in 2010. With the coastal community’s population at 15.7 million 
people in 2010, both the direct and indirect benefits generated by the fishing industry are 
important for the community (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2011). 
 It is the job of the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council (SAFMC or the 
Council) to make sure that fisheries in the South Atlantic are protected. In 1976, 
Congress enacted the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act. The 
Magnuson Act extended the United States’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to 200 
nautical miles off of the coast. The Act also established eight fishery management 
councils whose responsibility it would be to create fishery management plans for all 
fisheries located within the EEZ.  Members of the fishery councils are appointed by the 
Secretary of Commerce from a list of nominees created by the state governors. Members 
consist of state representatives, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) region 
director, and other individuals with fishery knowledge such as academics, fishermen, 
government officials and fishing industry employees. The fishery councils also receive 
advice from numerous committees such as advisory panels for individual fishery 
management plans (FMPs), the Catch Share Committee, Scientific and Statistical 
Committee, and many, many more (see Appendix A). The councils are required to hold 
annual committee meetings that are open to the public; for example, SAFMC holds four 
meetings annually, one in each state under its jurisdiction. Finally, before enacting any 
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new regulations, the councils allow for a commenting period and often have public 
meetings to discuss the impending regulations. 
There have been two major reauthorizations to the Magnuson Act since its 
introduction that affect the fishery councils. First, in 1996, the Sustainable Fisheries Act 
was combined with the Magnuson Act (now known as the Magnuson-Stevens Act). This 
reauthorization charged the eight fishery management councils with additional 
responsibilities in order to prevent the collapse of commercially important fish stocks. 
The councils, in addition to providing management measures that would protect fish 
species from being overfished, were now required to lessen the amount of bycatch and 
protect important habitats. The second reauthorization, which happened in 2006, also 
changed the responsibilities of the fishery councils. They are now required to establish 
Annual Catch Limits (ACL) for all fisheries under their jurisdiction and to increase 
fishermen’s accountability. The 2006 reauthorization also states that fishery councils 
should begin considering market-based solutions to fisheries’ management, such as catch 
share programs or limited access privilege (LAP) programs. Catch shares is an umbrella 
term for the method of setting an annual total allowable catch (TAC) and allocating 
shares of that catch to fishermen. 
SAFMC has attempted to implement catch shares and LAP programs but has been 
unsuccessful, especially in comparison to the other fishery councils, five of which have 
multiple active programs. SAFMC, on the other hand, has only one active catch share 
program, the Wreckfish individual transferable quota program, which was implemented 
back in 1991 before the reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. The goal of this 
study was to understand the opinions fisheries’ stakeholders have of catch share programs 
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and how those opinions vary across stakeholder groups. In order to investigate 
stakeholder opinions, comments concerning three catch share amendments, each at a 
different stage of implementation, were analyzed by conducting a thematic analysis. The 
results showed little variation between stakeholder groups, with the most important 
themes being management specifics and economic impacts and the least important theme 
being environmental impacts. The lack of thematic variation between stakeholder groups 
who were in favor of catch shares and those who were against catch shares coupled with 
the presence of themes expressing concern about science and data and stakeholder 
relationships could be indicative of low social capital between stakeholder groups. This 
thesis concludes by providing implications for fisheries management and continued catch 
share development.   
Chapter one of this thesis will discuss the difference between open access 
fisheries and managed fisheries as well as traditional fisheries management methods. 
Chapter two will discuss the move to market-based management: the theory as well as the 
practical application within fisheries. Chapter three reviews stakeholder participation in 
the management process. Chapter four will feature the three catch share amendments that 
are part of the analysis. Chapter five will detail the data used in the analysis as well 
methodology. Chapter six will present the results of the analysis as well as a discussion of 
the results. The final chapter will conclude with aspects of the research that could be 
improved as well as avenues for continued research. 
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Chapter 1: Fisheries as a Common Pool Resource 
Open Access vs. Managed Fisheries 
 The cost of allowing our natural resources to remain open to all individuals has 
been well-known and understood since Garrett Hardin’s famous article Tragedy of the 
Commons (1968). In this article, Hardin illustrates how this “tragedy of the commons” 
works by explaining how farmers shepherd their cattle in a common field. The story goes 
that a farmer has the incentive to continue adding cattle to a field with limited spaces 
because the benefit of having the extra cattle is felt only by the farmer whereas the cost of 
less grazing spaces is felt by all of the farmers. This situation is essentially the same for 
fisheries: the benefits of overfishing are felt by the fisherman but the costs of overfishing 
are felt by the entire fishing fleet.  
 The key to preventing this situation is management. In his article Hardin suggests 
management by a strong central government or by privatization of the resource. 
Experience thus far has shown that Hardin was correct: Open access fisheries have 
resulted in overexploitation and collapse (Hardin, 1968). Even further, management 
methods that rely on the consensus of stakeholders or do not provide the ability to 
monitor and enforce regulations have continually resulted in collapse (Hilborn et. al., 
2005). Successful institutions, however, include strong government control, defined 
property rights, and even, in some cases, local cooperatives (Hilborn et. al., 2005). 
Getting to this type of management is not a simple endeavor; it requires a strong 
institutional system that provides the incentive for fishermen to act in a way that fosters 
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the conservation of their resource. The most important step toward creating institutions 
that have the ability to foster sustainability is looking for equity, stewardship, regulatory 
resilience, and efficiency (Hanna, 1995). Whether or not the current fisheries 
management mechanisms are achieving these goals is up to significant debate.  
Traditional Fisheries Management 
 Failure of fisheries management is often blamed on a lack of science or poor stock 
assessment methodology. While science clearly plays a role in how well fisheries are 
managed, sound scientific data is not sufficient to guarantee successful fisheries 
management (Dietz et. al., 2003). In fact, focusing solely on the biological issues and 
problems creates management mechanisms that ignore the economic value of fisheries as 
well as human welfare (Davis & Gartside, 2001). Fisheries are fundamentally based on 
relationships: the relationship between those who are governed (resource users), the 
institutions, rules and management mechanisms used to govern, and finally the ecological 
systems (Jentoft, 2007). How traditional fisheries management methods have failed or 
succeeded depends on the specific management institution. Private property, top-down 
government management, and community management all have distinct costs and 
benefits (Acheson, 2006). 
 Fisheries are commonly managed via top-down regulations. This causes 
stakeholders to believe that the government is exclusively in charge, preventing 
beneficial communication (Lane & Stephenson, 2000). This is often a result of the 
scientists, engineers, and managers having too little concern or consideration for the local 
culture. This may seem like an insignificant factor; but, in fact, if managers do not 
properly understand the local culture, they will be unable to select the appropriate 
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incentives for conservation. This lack of concern for local cultures often leads to 
frustration through the community and, ultimately, poor management techniques 
(Acheson, 2006). For example, case studies have shown that the permit system that is 
currently in place throughout fisheries in the United States and abroad offers the wrong 
incentive to fishermen. Instead of focusing on conservation, fishermen are focused on 
fishing as much as possible as quickly as possible (Cinti et. al., 2010). Even worse, when 
all stakeholder opinions are considered, governments often place more concern on being 
fair to all stakeholders as opposed to achieving goals. This focus on “being fair” simply 
results in all stakeholders viewing some part of the process as flawed (Eagle & Kuker, 
2010).  
 One could argue that local cooperatives would be a more successful method of 
management because those that are involved in management are a distinct part of the 
local culture. While there has been evidence of this type of management working, it has 
all been theoretical (Hilborn et. al., 2005). However, in order for local cooperatives to be 
successful, numerous societal elements need to be present including a community with a 
high amount of social capital, secure resource boundaries, and homogeneity (Acheson, 
2006; North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990, 2000).  
 Some scholars argue that the correct tools for managing fisheries, clear and well-
defined property rights, exist but have not been legally enforced (Beddington et. al., 
2007). It is often thought that property rights are most successful when they are coupled 
with other management mechanisms such as regional management, protected areas, and 
strong monitoring (Couper & Smith, 1997). Property-rights, often coupled with market-
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based management mechanisms, have been widely discussed throughout the literature 
and are now regarded as the future of successful fisheries’ management. 
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Chapter 2: Market-Based Management 
Theory Behind Market-Based Management 
 
 Property rights and market-based mechanisms are based on neoclassical economic 
theory of property rights and privilege (Wingard, 2000). The argument for market based 
solutions to common resource management stems from many disciplines. The key issue 
is that when held as a common property, resources do not yield any economic rent. The 
lack of economic rent results in the overcapitalization of the fisheries and eventual 
depletion (Gordon, 1954). Following this idea, the issue with fisheries becomes a 
question of ownership. Common property is typically open access or “owned” by the 
government or sometimes by a community or other collective entity. This often results in 
practical confusion. In order to help better conceptualize property rights, Schalger and 
Ostrom developed five levels of property rights: access, withdrawal, management, 
exclusion, and alienation. Access is the right to enter a specific property; withdrawal is 
the right to extract from the property (ie. the right to fish); management is the right to 
regulate the resource; exclusion is the right to determine who does and does not have 
access to the property; and finally, alienation is the right to buy or sell any of the previous 
rights (1992). Market-based solutions typically give resource users the right to alienation. 
However, there has been research that shows that market-based regulation, while 
supported theoretically, in practice collaborative management often appears more 
successful; and managers should focus on splitting the right to management between 
public authorities and civil societies, including resource user groups (Dubbink & van 
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Vilet, 1996). Property rights are inherently embedded in all aspects of resource 
management, including the ever changing historical, political, and social climates. 
Current resource management has failed examine how property rights are affecting 
management and, instead, have focused on resource communities. This has unfortunately 
led to a focus on community failures instead of market failures. What needs to happen is 
a focus on how markets are affecting user groups’ actions as opposed to how user groups 
are affecting the market (McCay & Jentoft, 1998).  
 In simple terms, the goal of property rights and market based solutions is to 
provide resource users with a stake in the resource that will provide them with the 
incentive to make sacrifices in the name of sustaining their resource (Acheson, 2006). 
Property rights achieve this by altering the economic flow of the resource in a way that 
essentially eliminates competition, allowing resource users to make decisions towards 
sustainability (Beddington et. al., 2007). When it comes to property rights for extractive 
resource users, the goal is to decrease overcapitalization of the resource, while at the 
same time, achieving efficiency by increased income to users. This can be done through 
the leasing of shares or other similar arrangements (Acheson, 2006). 
 Simply establishing property rights is not sufficient for successful management; 
there are other management mechanisms that need to be in place in order to protect 
resources. First, the rights need to be clearly defined. Often times, confusion of property 
rights is the result of freely giving rights out to resource users. This method almost 
always results in the failure of property right regimes (Acheson, 2006; Bromley, 2008). 
Second, there needs to be enforcement to ensure that those who have shares are only 
extracting the resource amount that they are allotted by their shares and that those 
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individuals who do not own shares are not participating in extraction. This enforcement 
also needs to be low in cost to both the managers and the resource users (Acheson, 2006).  
 Property rights may not always be the correct solution to common resource 
management, depending on the characteristics of the resource to be managed. For 
example, in situations where there are long time horizons,  uncertainty about the 
continued availability of the resource or increasingly high economic pressures, users may 
have more of an incentive to exploit the resource even in the presence of clearly-defined 
property rights (Acheson, 2006; Coleman, 2011). Also, in situations where the growth 
rate of the resource is less than the discount rate, there is increased incentive to exploit 
the resource (Acheson, 2006).  
Application to Fisheries Management 
 Property rights and market-based management solutions are applied to fisheries in 
the form of catch shares. As stated in the introduction, “catch shares” is an umbrella term 
for the method of setting an annual total allowable catch (TAC) and allocating shares of 
that catch to fishermen. There are many forms of catch shares, but the ones most 
commonly used in fisheries include limited access privilege programs (LAPPs), 
individual fishing quotas (IFQs), individual transferable quotas (ITQs), community 
quotas, and regional fisheries associations. LAPPs, sometimes referred to as dedicated 
access privileges (DAPs), are federal permits allowing the harvest of a specific amount of 
the TAC that can be issued to individuals or groups. IFQs and ITQs on the other hand are 
harvest privileges given to an individual or entity. The difference between IFQs and ITQs 
is that ITQs allow fishermen to sell or lease their share of the TAC to others. Community 
quotas are shares that are allocated to communities that are dependent on fishing for their 
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livelihood. Regional Fishing Associations (RFAs) are voluntary organizations that 
include recreational and commercial fishermen and industry workers that can be granted 
harvest privileges if they meet a list of specific criteria. These organizations may only 
receive access after initial allocation of rights (SAFMC). 
 All types of catch shares provide property rights that are more exclusive than 
traditional management methods. With traditional fisheries management mechanisms, 
there is no incentive for fishermen to conserve; and without that incentive, they will 
simply over-harvest the fishery with no regard to the long term consequences. This lack 
of incentive causes over capitalization and use of poor gear that typically results in high 
levels of bycatch. Traditional management mechanisms are not only failing to solve this 
problem; they tend to make it much worse (Fujita & Bonzon, 2005). As was discussed 
above, when catch shares are successful, they have the ability to prevent fisheries’ 
collapse, while at the same time increasing efficiency and reshaping the political 
landscape (Hannesson, 2005; Huppert, 2006). They also can prevent overcapitalization of 
the fishing fleet by getting rid of the excess effort that is often present under traditional 
fisheries’ management. As a result, there is an increase in fishermen’s safety and 
ecological and economic gains (Chu, 2009; Fujita & Bonzon, 2005; Gibbs, 2007; 
Hilborn, 2007; Mackino & Bromley, 2002).  
Catch shares are able to do this because they provide an individual incentive for 
conservation; and even more importantly, they provide a financial incentive for 
conservation. This financial incentive has the ability to decrease the level of competition 
making it easier for fishermen to make sacrifices for the long terms sustainability of the 
fish stock (Costello et. al., 2008; Hilborn, 2007). Large-N studies of catch statistics have 
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supported the idea that catch share management has the ability to prevent overfishing as 
well as help improve stocks (Costello et. al., 2008). The increased economic gain from 
catch shares can even be used to counteract the initial cost of implementation. Managers 
could take out loans from different organizations to be paid back using money from the 
economic gain, or they could enact user fees which would help extend the economic 
gains to the wider public (Fujita & Bonzon, 2005; Hannesson, 2005). Depending on the 
type of catch share program, other benefits can accrue. For example, community based 
quotas have the ability to keep all of the usual benefits of catch shares, while at the same 
time addressing costs within the community and minimizing social impacts (Wingard, 
2005). It is important to note when investigating catch shares that the research is often 
focused on one discipline. This results in the identification of advantages in the eyes of 
one discipline while discounting the disadvantages to other disciplines (Gibbs, 2009).  
Despite these theoretical benefits of catch share programs, opposition from 
stakeholder groups has resulted in many policies’ failing before they have even begun 
(Hannesson, 2005). As a result, in 1996 the Sustainable Fisheries Act, an amendment to 
the Magnuson Stevens Act, placed a moratorium on catch share programs until 2002. 
Many argue that the issue with catch shares is that they are not full property rights and 
thus do not yield all of the supposed benefits (Copes, 1986; Mackino & Bromley, 2002). 
Others argue that the disagreement is not about the property rights but is about the 
economic windfalls some stakeholders will receive and the economic rents  they will 
have in perpetuity (Mackino & Bromley 2002). This is especially true because with catch 
shares the benefits that are accruing are only experienced by those who are participating 
in the program (Branch, 2009). Since the goal of catch shares is to prevent 
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overcapitalization and excessive effort, consolidation of the fishery is a natural 
occurrence, meaning that there will be fishermen who are left out of the program and thus 
the benefits (Branch, 2009). 
There are also concerns about whether or not catch shares will be able to protect 
fish stocks and the environment. Studies have shown that while catch shares have a 
positive effect on the target fish species, there are mixed effects on non-target fish 
species. This is possibly due to spillover from participants who have been pushed out of 
the target fishery and now must make a living by fishing the non-target species. It is also 
possible, especially in areas where there has been significant recent development of catch 
share programs, that fishermen will increase the amount they catch in order to increase 
their historical landings, a common element factored into initial catch share allocation 
(Branch, 2009). There are also certain characteristics that might make certain fish species 
unfit for catch share management. For example, those species that are short-lived, change 
quickly or are relatively unstable are likely to continue to collapse under catch share 
management (Copes, 1986).  
The costs of catch share programs can also be a concern. Managers will need to 
invest in monitoring and enforcement in order to prevent by-catch, high-grading, and 
quota-busting. Without proper monitoring and enforcement, there is always a possibility 
that fishermen with shares will fish more than they are allocated or that those without 
shares will continue to fish regardless (Copes, 1986). The view fishermen have of 
property rights also has the potential to cause spatial problems, for instance, creating 
conflict when others want to use fishing grounds for the development of marine protected 
areas or coastal wind power initiatives (Gibbs, 2007). The biggest concern is that 
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biological and economic impacts will prevent catch shares from achieving their ultimate 
goals (Wingard, 2000). 
There are some necessary requirements for catch share programs that may prevent 
or at least decrease possible damages. The way to decrease these damages is to make sure 
that catch share programs are coupled with other beneficial mechanisms such as strong 
monitoring and enforcement, marine protected areas, and effective TACs (Chu, 2009). 
For example, if managers establish the quota as the weight of fish a fisherman catches 
while fishing as opposed to the weight of fish a fisherman lands at the dock, there will be 
an incentive to use more efficient gear preventing bycatch and providing a negative 
incentive for highgrading (choosing only the highest quality fish and discarding the rest) 
(Branch, 2009). Determining how a catch share program should be designed in order to 
prevent damages is challenging. It is important to make sure that each program is 
designed with a specific fishery and community in mind (Copes, 1986; Fujita & Bonzon, 
2005). 
The literature is full of suggestions on how catch shares should be altered. For 
example, it has been suggested that fishermen should have to bid for shares via an auction 
process and that these shares should be for a limited term only (Bromley, 2008; Mackino 
& Bromley, 2002). In the end, while it appears that catch shares are theoretically sound, 
caution is warranted; and continued research into practiced catch shares is necessary 
(Copes, 1986).  
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Chapter 3: Stakeholder Participation in Management 
 How much participation stakeholders have in fisheries management varies with 
each individual situation. Even when stakeholder participation is encouraged long held 
tensions can make moving forward challenging. Despite the challenge, research has 
shown that management institutions that prevent fishermen from being involved and thus 
from becoming responsible resource users, prevents successful management methods 
from being developed. Instead, the development of management programs should be 
centered on the resource users (Lane & Stephenson, 2000). 
 Unfortunately, communication between stakeholders and managers is remarkably 
one-way. Often, the information that is communicated to stakeholders is not easily 
understandable (Government Accountability Office, 2006). An analysis by the 
Government Accountability Office determined five areas of communication that needed 
to be improved. First, there need to be more education and outreach efforts conducted. 
Second, the location, time, and format of annual meetings needed to be varied. Third, the 
development process should be simplified and streamlined. Fourth, diverse interests 
should be represented within the council process. Finally, the authority to make decisions 
should be shared among stakeholders (2006).  
 There is also a movement to make science more accessible to fishermen, but the 
democratization of science does not come without its challenges. It often involves the 
justification of allowing some individuals into the realm of science while still excluding 
other individuals. This is why fisheries’ management should focus on the idea of 
17 
 
expertise as opposed to science. This requires the acknowledgement that some 
stakeholders might have expertise that is not traditional science. For example, 
fishermen’s stories should be treated as experience that is valuable for fisheries 
management (Carolan, 2006).  
 Research has shown that involving stakeholders, especially fishermen, in the 
policy formulation process is especially important for fisheries’ management. In 
particular, understanding fishermen’s behavior can help managers implement the correct 
incentives for conservation of the resource (Hilborn, 2007). Fishermen often have 
beneficial knowledge of the fish stocks with which they interact on a regular basis (Neis 
et. al., 1999). In order to capitalize on this knowledge, other stakeholders, in particular 
fishermen and industry members, need to be given a leadership role within the 
government (Hanna, 1995; Lane & Stephenson, 2000). 
 The extent to which the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council is obligated 
to involve fisheries’ stakeholders is outlined in the Magnuson Stevens Act’s guidelines 
for implementation of amendments. The Council is required to publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of a 60-day public comment period with details about the 
implementation plan including details of the regulations, fishing eligibility, needs of the 
fishing community, costs of the program, and the procedures for implementation. During 
this 60-day window, the Council is also required to hold public hearings in all of the 
states that will be affected by the new regulations. Finally, within 45-days after the public 
comment window has closed, the Council must analyze the comments received and 
publish a final implantation plan in the Federal Register. 
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Chapter 4: Catch Shares in the US South Atlantic Region 
Amendment 20A to the Snapper Grouper FMP (Wreckfish) 
The only active catch share program in the South Atlantic is the Wreckfish ITQ. 
Developed in 1992 and preceded only by the Ocean Quahog and Surf Clam program in 
the Mid-Atlantic region, the Wreckfish ITQ is one of the oldest ITQ programs in the 
United States (NOAA, 2009). The directed Wreckfish fishery started in 1987 with only 
six vessels, but it began to increase rapidly once fishermen realized that Wreckfish could 
be marketed as a substitute for grouper (Gauvin, 2004). By the time SAFMC decided to 
try to bring the fishery under control, there were over 40 vessels in the fishery landing 
over 4 million pounds of Wreckfish (Gauvin, 1994). 
Initially, a permit system and a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) were established, 
but this quickly led to a derby style fishery (Gauvin, 1994). As with all derby fisheries, 
not only did this make fishing particularly dangerous by increasing conflict and forcing 
fishermen to go out to sea in bad weather, but also it decreased the dockside prices 
fishermen could get for the Wreckfish because the market became flooded with fish 
(Gauvin, 1994). 
These issues are what initially caused SAFMC members to begin considering an 
ITQ as an alternative method for managing the Wreckfish fishery. The goal was to 
address the economic and safety issues created by the derby fishery while, at the same 
time, giving fishermen a firm stake in the fishery and, as a result, an incentive to conserve 
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and protect the resource: the basic theory behind catch share systems of management 
(SAFMC, 2011). After a significant amount of debate surrounding who would be eligible 
for shares and how those shares would be allocated, the final rule for the ITQ program 
was listed in the Federal Register on March 5, 1992 (57 Fed. Reg. 7886-7892, 1992). 
Initially, the ITQ program struggled because fishermen were inexperienced and lacked 
the education necessary to make the ITQ a success. As a result the market place for 
Wreckfish shares did not run efficiently, and those who were looking to get out of the 
fishery were unable to sell their shares to other fishermen (Gauvin, 1994). 
Currently, SAFMC is working on Amendment 20A to the Snapper Grouper 
Fishery Management Plan, of which the Wreckfish is a part, to redistribute all of the 
shares that are considered inactive to fishermen who are still active in the fishery 
(SAFMC, 2011). Committee meeting minutes reveal that many individuals, particularly 
those on the Snapper Grouper Advisory Panel, feel that Wreckfish ITQ program should 
simply be invalidated; and the fishery should be treated as open access (SAFMC, 2011). 
Others, like the Social and Economic Sciences Panel, believe that instead of 
redistributing inactive permits, an auction should be held; this way the money from the 
auctioned shares would be given to the original shareholder (SAFMC, 2011). Still others 
believe that it would be best to wait two years and  let the fishermen know that shares not 
used in those two years would be redistributed (SAFMC, 2011). These differences in 
opinion all focus on one common theme: how to define an inactive permit and the 
appropriateness of interfering with the share market, regardless of whether or not it is 
functioning as initially intended. Once the Council decided to start looking into 
redistributing Wreckfish catch shares, they attempted to get into contact with all 
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fishermen currently holding a permit. As a result, the percent of inactive shares dropped 
from 41% to 28%, showing that some inactive permit holders were still capable of 
making the decision to sell their permits (SAFMC, 2011). 
In addition to addressing the issue of inactive shares, Amendment 20A adds 
additional regulations, now required by the 2006 Magnuson Stevens Act Reauthorization. 
It establishes a share cap that will prevent any one stakeholder from owning more than 
49% of the shares and creates an appeals process that would give fishermen a 90-day 
period to contest the number of shares they received during allocation (SAFMC, 2011).  
Amendment 6 to the Golden Crab FMP 
Along with Amendment 20A, SAFMC is also working to push through 
Amendment 6 to the Golden Crab Fishery Management Plan, which would establish a 
catch share program for the fishery. The hope is that establishing a catch share program 
will, among other things, prevent derby fishing, keep experienced fishermen who know 
how to protect deep-water coral habitat in the fishery, and create an incentive for 
fishermen to protect the economic efficiency of the resource (SAFMC, 2012).  
The Council and the various Golden Crab committees and advisory panels have 
spent a significant amount of time discussing the development of the catch share program 
including the common issues of eligibility, allocation, and interaction with other 
regulations. However, meeting minutes indicated that Golden Crab stakeholders hold a 
multitude of opinions on why they do or do not want a catch share program for their 
fishery. For example, some are convinced that the catch share program will benefit the 
fishery and the environment as a whole by keeping experienced fishermen in and 
inexperienced fishermen out of the fisheries. Others have concerns about eligibility. The 
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current Amendment 6 legislation distributes 25% of shares equally among those 
fishermen who are eligible for the program and splits 75% of the shares based on 
historical landings from 1997-2010 (SAFMC, 2012). This would mean that the smallest 
permit would receive 2.27% of the Annual Catch Limit (ACL), which equates to 
approximately 44,000 lbs. of Golden Crab. The Council agreed that 44,000 lbs. would 
allow a fisherman three trips a year (SAFMC, 2012). The question then becomes whether 
the benefits (revenue gained from the landing of golden crab) of those three trips 
outweigh the costs associated with spending three days fishing (maintenance, gear, safety 
costs etc). If the costs outweigh the benefits, fishermen will likely be unable to continue 
fishing for Golden Crab. 
Some stakeholders are also concerned that the goal of protecting the fish stock 
and environment will not be achieved due to how Amendment 6 may interact with or 
negate other regulations. Under the current regulations, Golden Crab permits are divided 
into three different sections: the southern fishing section, the middle fishing section and 
the northern fishing section. In order to fish in either section, you must have a permit 
specific to that section (SAFMC, 2012). Some fishermen hold permits for both sections, 
while others hold permits for only one of the sections. The new catch share program 
being proposed could potentially alter the functionality of this system. Once the catch 
shares have been allocated to individuals, there are no regulations in place that would 
prevent a fisherman who holds permits for both of the fishing zones from transferring all 
of his shares to a single permit or vessel (SAFMC, 2012). This has the potential to cause 
heavy exploitation of the species in one of the zones. The fishermen with permits for both 
zones would simply be able to move to the other once the crab became overexploited, but 
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fishermen who only hold a permit for the overexploited zone would be forced to stay in 
the devastated area, making it more challenging for them to land a substantial catch 
(SAFMC, 2012). It is also possible that a fisherman who holds a permit for the southern 
zone to buy shares from a fisherman who has a permit to fish in the middle zone; and as a 
result, the southern zone will be fished more than it was after the initial allocation of 
shares (SAFMC, 2012). SAFMC believes that because catch share program are market-
based management mechanisms that the market will take care of any potential 
exploitation issues and that the location of fishing vessels will be self-regulating 
(SAFMC, 2012). 
Amendment 21 to the Snapper Grouper FMP 
The most thoroughly researched fishery for catch share implementation has been 
the Snapper Grouper fishery complex. In order to better understand how catch share type 
programs would work in the South Atlantic, SAFMC formed the LAP Program 
Workgroup in 2006 to investigate how a LAP Program might work for the large and 
financially significant Snapper Grouper fishery complex. In 2008, two years after its 
creation, the LAPP Workgroup issued their final report. Ultimately, the Workgroup was 
unable to come to a consensus on whether or not a LAPP should be implemented in the 
Snapper Grouper fishery, but they did encourage the Council to continue to research the 
idea of LAPPs as a management method (Hartig, 2008). 
 The final report listed numerous benefits and concerns about the effects LAPPs 
might have on the environment and on the economic and social aspects of the fishing 
community. The primary concern was that there is a serious lack of data on the Snapper 
Grouper fishery, particularly in relation to looking at stock abundance (Hartig et. al., 
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2008). This makes it challenging to tell whether or not species are overfished; and more 
importantly, it makes it challenging to set a TAC that accurately reflects how the stock 
has changed since the implementation of the LAPP. The workgroup wanted to make sure 
that improved methodology was introduced to ensure that, as time passed, the TACs 
would increase (Hartig et. al., 2008). 
 The yearly TAC increasing as time passes is particularly important in the Snapper 
Grouper fishery, which in the past few years has seen a number of species with TACs 
decreased drastically (Hartig et. al., 2008). This was another big concern for the 
workgroup: With TACs being set so low, it was possible that even fishermen with high 
historical landings, who would receive a large percentage of the allocation, would end up 
with such a small amount of actual poundage that they would be unable to stay in the 
fishery (Hartig et. al., 2008). If this LAPP program would have the potential to force the 
large fishermen out of the fishery, then the small fishermen would not have a chance to 
continue fishing. This could have devastating effects on the coastal economies, especially 
in areas like South Carolina, where majority of fishermen have permits to fish Snapper-
Grouper species (Jepson, 2005). 
 This was not the only concern the workgroup had with how LAPPs were going to 
affect local fishing communities. The workgroup felt that a LAPP had the potential to 
change the geographic distribution of landings (Hartig et. al., 2008). If this were to 
happen, there might be communities that thrived with increased landings leading to 
increases in revenue and jobs; but there would also be communities that would be 
negatively impacted, losing not only economically but also culturally (Hartig et. al., 
2008). 
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 Fortunately, all of these concerns were coupled with possible benefits for the 
environment and fishing community. The Workgroup believed that a LAP program could 
benefit the environmental, economic, and social aspects of the Snapper Grouper fishery. 
Primarily, they felt that catch shares would give fishermen an incentive to participate in 
preservation of the fish stock, as is supported by market-based management theory. 
Coupled with increased incentives, catch shares would also prevent the overages that are 
common with the current quota management system. The local economy would benefit 
from catch shares because they would, theoretically, increase the TAC as well as allow 
fishermen more flexibility. Next, a decrease in the size of the fleet will result in an 
increase in the profits made from landings. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, catch 
shares are socially beneficial because they are the most efficient management method for 
consolidation of the fishery, a necessity to prevent overfishing (Hartig et. al., 2008). 
 As a result of this study, the SAFMC not only continued to look into a LAP 
program for the Snapper Grouper fishery as recommended by the LAP Program 
Workgroup; but in 2010, it began developing and taking comment on Amendment 21 to 
the Snapper Grouper FMP. The purpose of Amendment 21 was to reduce the 
overcapacity of the fisheries, particularly with the goal of reducing the impact of the 
commercial fishing sector. However, due to strong opposition from stakeholders in 
March of 2011, SAFMC voted to terminate any more movement on Amendment 21. At 
this time, there has been no move to begin reconsidering catch shares for the Snapper 
Grouper FMP (NOAA Southeast Regional Office (SERO)). 
 In order to get a more complete picture of stakeholder opinions, comments 
submitted to SAFMC concerning the three amendments above are analyzed. This goal of 
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this thesis is to understand the opinions of different stakeholder groups regarding 
different aspects of the catch share programs for Wreckfish, proposed Amendment 20A 
to the Snapper Grouper FMP, Golden Crab, proposed Amendment 6 to the Golden Crab 
FMP, and Snapper Grouper, the proposed Amendment 21 to the Snapper Grouper FMP 
(Wreckfish). Specifically this thesis addresses two questions: “What are the biggest 
concerns about the catch share programs expressed by stakeholders in the comments?” 
and  “How do the opinions of different stakeholders on catch share amendments vary 
from one another?” For more information on each amendment see Appendix B. 
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Chapter 5: Data and Analysis 
Data Source 
Amendments 6, 20A and 21 (Golden Crab, Wreckfish and Snapper Grouper, 
respectively) were chosen for analysis because they are all at different stages. 
Amendment 20A is addressing the Wreckfish ITQ which has been implemented for ten 
years; Amendment 6 is in the process of being developed and implemented; and 
Amendment 21 was discarded during development. While looking at the meeting minutes 
from the annual SAFMC meetings as well as advisory panel and other committee 
meetings gives a general indication of how fisheries stakeholders feel about these 
Amendments minutes are hardly exhaustive. Many fisheries’ stakeholders may have 
other commitments or financial constraints that prevent them from attending a meeting. 
While only some stakeholders will be able to attend a SAFMC meeting, most 
stakeholders have the ability to submit a formal comment to SAFMC. 
 In order to investigate the opinions of different stakeholders regarding the 
Snapper Grouper, Wreckfish, and Golden Crab catch share amendments, a qualitative 
thematic analysis was performed on stakeholder comments on each amendment 
submitted to the South Atlantic Fisheries Management Council between late 2010 and 
early 2012. Data was obtained by contacting individuals at SAFMC to gain access to 
their database, which contains all of the comments submitted to them concerning current 
and past amendments. The comments include both emails and letters submitted to 
SAFMC during comment periods and otherwise, as well as submitted petitions and 
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transcripts from public comment hearings. The data set used for this research includes all 
of the comments available for each amendment. The amendments are all recent or 
currently still being discussed within the Council, so the data ranges from late 2010 to 
early 2012. There were a total of 4,874 comments. The majority of them concerned the 
Snapper-Grouper amendment (n = 3,811), followed by the Golden Crab amendment (n = 
1,057), and the Wreckfish amendment (n = 6). For all three amendments, nonprofits 
submitted the most comments, followed by fishermen.  
Analysis 
An inductive thematic analysis of stakeholder comments was conducted, with a 
ground theory methodology originally discussed in Glaser and Strauss (1967). The 
purpose of grounded theory is to analyze the data to determine the theory as opposed to 
theory informing the data analysis. There are four parts to a grounded theory analysis: 
identification of codes that help to group the data, the creation of concepts, collections of 
codes that discuss similar concepts, the creation of categories that contain similar 
concepts, and the theory or explanation of the data. 
 The thematic analysis presented here consisted of three different stages: manual 
coding of comments by amendment, stakeholder group, and “for/in favor” or “against” 
catch shares (the codes step); a thorough reading of sixty-six comments to identify key 
themes (categories) and subthemes (concepts); and coding for the identified themes using 
the qualitative software NVivo 10 (identification of the theory). Initially, comments were 
separated by amendment, stakeholder group, and method of comment submission 
(transcripts for public hearings, emails, letters and petitions). The separation resulted in 
the identification of five different stakeholder groups: fishermen, industry workers, 
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government officials, managers, and nonprofit organizations. It is important to note that 
not all amendments received comments from every single stakeholder group. The 
fishermen stakeholder group included both commercial and recreational fishermen. 
Industry workers included those stakeholders who owned businesses directly affected by 
fisheries’ management such as bait shops or charter owners. Government officials 
included congressmen. Managers included any stakeholders identifying themselves as a 
member of SAFMC or a member of one of the various committees. Finally, nonprofits 
included both environmental organizations and fishermen’s advocacy groups.  
Once all comments were separated by stakeholder group, five comments from 
each stakeholder submission type were selected randomly for in-depth analysis using a 
random number generator (a total of 66 comments). The comments were read 
individually, and the key points or themes in each comment were identified. A second 
researcher read and identified key points in order to ensure the reliability of theme 
identification. The second researcher identified similar key points. Then, collaboratively, 
these key points were classified into broad themes. 
Five key themes were identified: environmental impacts, economic impacts, 
science and data, stakeholder relationships, and management methods. The themes were 
then divided into subthemes in order to get a more accurate picture of what stakeholders 
were discussing in their comments. The environmental impact theme includes discussion 
on the overfishing status of amendment species, displacement of fishing effort, protection 
of species, highgrading, bycatch, and habitat damage. As a result, the environment was 
divided into two subthemes: discussion of species impacts (overfishing and stock 
improvement) and discussion of habitat impacts (environmental damage or protection). 
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The economic impact theme includes discussion on how catch shares affect the number 
of jobs available, tourism, local seafood availability, price of landed fish, fishing fleet 
size, and the cost of going fishing. The economic theme was then divided up into three 
different subthemes: the discussion of jobs, costs, and tourism. The science and data 
theme deals with opinions on the data being used to establish catch shares including the 
availability and reliability of the data, possible bias within the data, and transparency of 
the data. The science and data theme was specific enough that the original read through 
of comments did not indicate the need for any subthemes. The fourth theme, stakeholder 
relationships, discussed the trust between managers and fishermen, the relationship 
between the recreational and commercial fishing sector, and the influence of nonprofit 
organizations on Council decisions, each of which were used as subthemes. The fifth 
theme, management methods, included discussion on the increase and decrease of 
regulations, traditional management methods, perceived ownership of the fisheries and 
property rights. The management methods theme was divided into two subthemes: 
discussion of traditional management methods and discussion of catch share specific 
regulations. 
 In conjunction with the identification of themes, all 4,874 comments were 
separated based on whether or not they were for or against catch shares. Each comment 
was briefly scanned to determine whether or not the commenter was for or against catch 
share amendments. A comment was identified as against a catch share if they expressed 
the opinion that catch shares should not be implemented in any fishery or if they were 
against the specific amendment. For example: 
“Catch Shares are NOT about the resource they are all about creating a handful of fish 
lords who retire on the front porch collecting money from leasing public resources. They 
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shut out small businesses, eliminating countless JOBS and prohibit the young from 
participating in an honorable industry.” 
 
Comments were identified as in favor of catch shares if they expressed support for catch 
shares in general or the specific catch share amendment. For example: 
“I support the Council's progress toward better fisheries management through catch 
shares for the snapper, grouper and golden crab commercial fisheries.” 
 
Once the comments were separated based on support of catch shares, a text-based 
analysis of all comments was conducted to identify the existence of themes within each 
stakeholder group and feeling toward catch shares. In order to analyze quickly a large 
number of comments based on these criteria a keyword search using NVivo 10 was 
conducted. NVivo 10 (QSR International) is qualitative analysis software that allows a 
researcher to analyze and organize textual data based on specific criteria. This includes 
the ability to run complex key word searches as well as the ability to code data into 
specific nodes or groups. When conducting a keyword search, NVivo allows researchers 
to determine how exact they would like the software to be when searching for a word. 
This can include a search for the exact keywords to a search for all the synonyms of a 
keyword. For the purposes of this analysis, the second exactness setting was used, which 
allowed for the search of keywords and all associated stemmed words (ie. overfishing and 
overfished). Keywords representative of each subtheme were used for the thematic 
analysis and were identified based on the initial thematic reading of the comments (see 
Table 1 for a list of keywords). The initial thorough reading of comments to identified 
themes showed little variation between submission type (email, letters etc.), so comments 
were analyzed based on amendment, stakeholder group, and catch share support only. 
The number of comments that mentioned one or more of the keywords was recorded. The 
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percentage of comments discussing each theme was calculated to determine how the 
themes varied between amendments and between stakeholder groups. 
Table 1. Keywords used for stakeholder comment analysis. 
Theme Subtheme One Subtheme Two Subtheme Three 
Environmental 
Impacts 
Biological: 
overfishing, 
collapse, extinction, 
rebuild, discard, 
bycatch 
Habitat: protection, 
damage, habitat, 
environment 
N/A 
Economic Impacts Jobs: access, 
unemployment, 
employment, 
livelihood, 
participation, 
consolidation, jobs 
Cost: price, value, 
profit, sell, buy, 
boom, bust, cost 
Tourism: charters, 
vacation, tourism 
Stock Research Data: assessment, 
science, 
transparency, 
collection, 
information, 
evidence, data 
N/A N/A 
Stakeholder 
Relationships 
Nonprofit 
Influence: 
nonprofit, Pew, EDF 
Recreational vs. 
Commercial: 
mixed, sector, 
trawlers, longliners 
Managers: trust, 
honest, dishonest, 
lies, exclusion, 
voting, 
communication 
Management 
Methods 
Traditional: bag, 
gear, seasons, size, 
limit, ban 
Catch Shares: 
closure, quota, 
owner, shares, 
transfer, TAC, 
Annual Catch 
Limit, rights 
property 
N/A 
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Chapter 6: Results and Discussion 
Results 
 Results of the “in favor” and “against” comment analysis are summarized in 
Table 2 on page 34, followed by the thematic analysis results in Appendix C. The results 
of the thematic analysis of stakeholder groups for the Golden Crab Amendment 6, 
Snapper Grouper Amendment 21, and Wreckfish Amendment 20A are summarized in 
Tables 3-5, respectively. Each of the tables is organized based on the percentage of 
comments that expressed a certain opinion of catch shares or presented a specific 
subtheme. For example, four out of seven Golden Crab fishermen expressed that they 
were against catch shares, so the table shows that 57% of Golden Crab fishermen are 
against catch shares; or two out of four Golden Crab fishermen that were against catch 
shares, 50%, indicated concern about biological factors. 
Only eleven comments were submitted for the Golden Crab amendment, the low 
number of comments is likely explained by the fact that the Golden Crab fishery is 
relatively small and localized when compared to the Snapper Grouper fishery. An 
analysis of the comments showed that only a small majority of fishermen were against 
the amendment. Only one government official submitted a comment, and that comment 
expressed a disapproval of catch shares as a management mechanism. All of the 
stakeholders identifying themselves as managers or committee members were in support 
of catch shares. Finally, majority of the comments submitted by nonprofits were in 
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support of the amendment. The number of comments made by nonprofits was 
considerably more than any other stakeholder group.  
 With a total of 3,493 comments, the Snapper Grouper Amendment 21 received 
the most comments, likely because the fishery complex consists of numerous commercial 
and recreationally important species involving a large number of fishermen. Analysis of 
Snapper Grouper amendment comments revealed that a majority of stakeholders with a 
financial stake in the fishery (fishermen and industry workers), as well as those 
identifying themselves as managers, opposed Amendment 21. Government officials and 
nonprofits, on the other hand, were in support of the amendment. As with Golden Crab, 
nonprofits submitted significantly more comments than any other stakeholder group. 
 The Wreckfish Amendment 20A received the fewest number of comments with 
only six stakeholders voicing their opinions. The Wreckfish amendment addresses a catch 
share program (ITQs) that is already in place and, like the Golden Crab fishery, consists 
of only a small number of fishermen. The small number of comments makes it 
challenging to draw significant conclusions. With this limitation in mind, the data shows 
that Wreckfish fishermen are against the new amendment, while industry workers and 
two out of three nonprofits are in support of the new amendment that would revert 
inactive catch shares and the other nonprofit is against reversion because they feel the 
catch share program is detrimental to recreational fishermen.  
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Table 2. Distribution of Comments by Catch Share Opinion and Stakeholder Group 
  % 
Against 
% In 
Favor 
Total 
Golden Crab  Fishermen 57 43 7 
 Government 100 0 1 
 Managers 0 100 3 
 Nonprofits 2 98 1046 
Snapper Grouper Fishermen 99 1 1172 
 Government 0 100 1 
 Industry 98 2 41 
 Managers 100 0.00 2 
 Nonprofits 3 97 2277 
Wreckfish Fishermen 100 0. 1 
 Industry 0 100 2 
 Nonprofits 33 67 3 
 
 The results of the thematic analyses of stakeholder groups show that there is only 
minimal variation between different amendments and between different stakeholders. 
Golden Crab stakeholders that support catch shares discussed catch share specifics, 
species, and jobs. Golden Crab stakeholders against catch shares discussed jobs, 
traditional management, and the specifics of catch shares. Snapper Grouper stakeholders 
in favor of catch shares discussed jobs, relationships with managers, and the specifics of 
catch share programs. Those against catch shares discussed the data, the relationship 
between recreational and commercial fishermen, and the specifics of catch shares 
programs. Wreckfish stakeholders in favor of catch shares discussed the data, 
relationships with managers and traditional management. Those against discussed all of 
the five themes. 
In order to illustrate properly how stakeholders are discussing each of these 
themes, direct quotes will be presented throughout the results section. It is important to 
keep in mind that because the Golden Crab amendment and Wreckfish amendment 
received so few comments, the percentages are higher than the Snapper Grouper fishery.  
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Golden Crab Comments 
Keeping this fact in mind, within the Golden Crab fishery, fishermen who were 
against catch shares primarily discussed how catch shares would impact the economy, 
especially in relationship to job loss (75%) and the financial cost of the program as a 
result of having to buy shares or a decrease in the value of fish (75%). For example, one 
Golden Crab fishermen stated that: 
“I also just wanted to mention that although some of the permits that were leased had 
received some lands and held some value; some of us has purchased permits with NO 
lands and are now wondering as to how we are going to survive. I personally have lost a 
home as a result of this fishery when I started, and now I can see myself having to deal 
with another loss – what do I do with a boat and no permit?” 
 
Similar to Golden Crab fishermen, the government official, who was against the 
amendment, also focused their comments on the economic impacts of catch shares 
including the effect it would have on local jobs and tourism. Unlike fishermen, he did not 
focus on the possible financial costs of catch shares. 
“The current process often fails to consider the unintended consequences resulting in a 
disastrous impact on many individuals and businesses, such as those commercial and 
recreational fishermen who may be put out of business.” 
 
Golden Crab managers and nonprofits that were in support of the amendment addressed 
themes that were surprisingly similar to those of the fishermen and the government 
official that were against the amendment. Specifically, all stakeholders focused on the 
economic aspects of catch shares such as the effect on jobs, cost of being a fishermen, 
and tourism. Unlike the fishermen and government officials, managers and nonprofits 
discussed the impact the amendment would have on the environment (two out of three 
and 99.61%, respectively). Nonprofits also mentioned the relationship between managers 
and fishermen (93.87%). 
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 “Golden Crab Management objectives: Prevent overfishing of golden crab by 
preventing the fishing mortality rate from exceeding the fishing mortality rate that would 
produce maximum sustainable yield (Fmsy).” 
 
“Catch shares will end overfishing and rebuild fisheries, while stabilizing good jobs, 
improving local seafood availability and contributing to our local economy. These 
actions should be a top priority for the Council.” 
 
Snapper Grouper Comments 
The results of the Snapper Grouper analysis were very similar to the results of the Golden 
Crab analysis. Like Golden Crab fishermen, Snapper grouper fishermen who were 
against the amendment most frequently discussed how the economy would be impacted 
as a result of job loss and costs, 75% each, but were relatively unconcerned with tourism 
impacts (12.08%).  
“I come from a community where catch shares was implemented. All of your fishermen, 
what they’re saying to you, they’re correct, 100 percent correct. There will be less jobs, 
loss of opportunity and consolidation will happen in the remaining fishery until the rights 
to fish are held by very few. “ 
 
Unlike Golden Crab fishermen, Snapper Grouper fishermen were also concerned with the 
science and data being used to create these regulations (93.62%).  
 
“The SAFMC/NMFS has failed in the basic data and science of fisheries management, 
and should be restrained from enacting any new initiatives or management policies until 
they demonstrate core competencies in data collection and science.”  
 
Finally, fishermen commonly discussed the relationship between commercial and 
recreational fishermen (93.87%). 
 
“SO how can you propose ANY more restrictions on recreational anglers without first 
STOPPING commercial fishing of these and all other species?” 
 
Industry workers were also especially concerned about the impact the amendment would 
have on the economy via jobs (75%) and cost (65%), as well as the science and data 
being used to support catch shares (72.5%). However industry workers were less 
concerned about the relationship between recreational and commercial sectors (57.5%). 
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“If anglers can no longer catch these fish, eventually there will be no reason to have 
repair shops because the anglers will stop going out.” 
 
“The SAFMC has admitted they have flawed data, yet the government continues to allow 
these closures to take place with this data.” 
 
While only two managers submitted comments on the Snapper Grouper amendment they 
managed to discuss all of the themes and subthemes, with a particular focus on science 
and data, and stakeholder relationships. 
“I think that you could fix a lot of these problems that we’re seeing, if we had the data 
instead of using the data that’s not there.” 
 
“And I’m here to stay that with the exception of two votes, both from NGOs, they were the 
only ones that were interested in continuing the conversation with catch shares.” 
 
The government official and nonprofits were similar: they were in both in support of the 
Snapper Grouper amendment and discussed many of the things that those against the 
amendment discussed including impact on the economy in relation to jobs and 
stakeholder relationships in relation to how stakeholders interact with managers (one out 
of one and 99.86% respectively). Additionally, nonprofits discussed the impact the 
amendment would have on the environment, particularly involving the success of 
biological (99.59%) as opposed to habitat protection (0.36%). The comment by the 
government official also brought up the issue of science and data. 
“The Frank-Jones amendment [preventing catch share development] will only serve to 
accelerate that decline costing our local economies tens of millions of dollars in lost jobs 
and revenues.” 
 
“Catch shares will end overfishing and rebuild fisheries, while stabilizing good jobs, 
improving local seafood availability and contributing to our local economy.” 
 
Wreckfish Amendment Comments 
Finally, those stakeholders discussing the Wreckfish amendment (n = 6) managed to 
discuss the all five themes (nine subthemes). The fisherman who was against the 
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amendment discussed the impact on the environment and economy, specifically 
biological aspects, and the impact on jobs, as well as issues relating to the science 
available and finally the relationship between fishermen and managers. Similarly, those 
in the industry and nonprofits that were supportive of the amendment discussed the 
impact on jobs (one out of two and two out of two respectively), science (one out of two 
each) and relationship with managers (one out of two each).  For example, the following 
two comments illustrate how those against catch shares feel about the Council 
(stakeholder relationships): 
 “[The Council] destroyed [the Wreckfish] fishery with catch shares before it ever really 
got started. This gross incompetence has caused fishermen to put more pressure on the 
shallow water fisheries.” 
 
“One serious concern we have is the AP panels recommendation of eliminating the ITQ 
program! This is not a reflection of industry opinion, an AP panel needs to reach out to 
fishermen prior to making such a monumental recommendation. I urge council to look 
into their other recommendations and make sure they reflect the needs and opinions of 
the men they represent.” 
 
The comment below illustrates how Wreckfish stakeholders in support of the catch shares 
feel the ITQ program has improved the cost of fishing: 
 
“For 18 years this fishery has been humming along smoothly, a paragon of how 
successfully a catch share program can work. It is touted by many, even the Monterey 
Bay Aquarium, as an excellent example of how to best manage fisheries for sustainability 
and profit.” 
 
 It is important to mention that for all of the stakeholder groups, the majority of the 
comments for all amendments discussed specifics of traditional management and catch 
share management. This indicates a preference for or against traditional management. 
This also indicates that many stakeholders may have issues with specific aspects of the 
catch share amendment as opposed to the amendment as a method of management. A 
more in-depth analysis would be necessary to tease out these patterns. 
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 Also, the weight of the nonprofit sector is given in this study due to the number of 
comments submitted may be disproportionate due to the method in which the 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) submits comments. EDF encourages all of their 
members to submit comments on catch share amendments, often times by allowing them 
to submit a form letter directly available from their website (which can be edited should 
an individual choose to do so). This allows EDF to submit a large number of comments 
on their behalf quickly. 
Discussion 
 The results of the thematic analysis identified some interesting patterns 
concerning stakeholder opinions of catch share programs. First, specifics of catch share 
management (such as eligibility, allocation and cost recovery measures) were discussed 
throughout all amendments and all stakeholder groups. This may indicate that the 
subthemes within the broader management theme were too general to specify what really 
concerns stakeholders when it comes to the specific regulations involved in catch shares.  
 Second, the economy emerged as an important theme across all amendments and 
all stakeholder groups regardless of whether the group was in favor of catch shares or 
against catch shares. Knowing that the economy is the most important factor to all 
stakeholders will allow the Council to frame that catch share discussion in a way that will 
be meaningful to the stakeholders involved. Literature has shown that how environmental 
issues are framed has the ability to influence greatly how an individual deals with an 
issue and even their competency (Bardell, 1991). By properly framing catch share 
regulation, it is possible that the Council will be able to help reduce resistance to catch 
share implementation. 
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 When it comes to framing, it is also important to note the few discrepancies 
between the themes that stakeholders discuss. In particular, those already in support of 
catch shares, especially nonprofits, tend to discuss the environmental impacts more than 
those who are not in support of catch shares. Also, those against catch shares focus on the 
science and data that is available and its validity, whereas those in support of catch shares 
do not often mention this theme. Finally, the Snapper Grouper stakeholders were more 
concerned about the impact catch shares would have on tourism than any stakeholders 
from the other two amendments. 
 Fourth, it is interesting to note that the economy, and in particular the issue of 
jobs and cost, was a theme not only discussed between all amendments and all 
stakeholders, but also by both those who are in favor of catch shares and those who are 
against catch shares. This means that some stakeholders believe that catch shares will 
harm the economy, resulting and job loss and increase costs to fishermen, at the same 
time as other stakeholders believe that catch shares will stabilize and even improve the 
economy, resulting in more profits for fishermen and their communities. This 
overlapping pattern is consistent for all three of the catch share amendments. This could 
illustrate that there is a fundamental lack of understanding of catch share programs across 
stakeholder groups. It is possible that this is due to a lack of social capital between the 
Council and fishery stakeholders. 
 The idea that social capital is low is supported by the fifth important finding: the 
theme of stakeholder relationships, especially with fisheries managers, was present across 
all amendments and stakeholder groups. This indicates that stakeholders feel there is little 
social capital between them and managers. As shown in the methods chapter, the 
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keywords used to identify stakeholder relationships with managers included: trust, 
dishonest, honest, lies, exclusion, voting, and communication, all important aspects of the 
social capital that are necessary for effective relationships and thus effective 
management.  
 These results provide a number of implications for fisheries’ management. Past 
study results have shown that increasing stakeholder participation in the development of 
catch share programs can help increase their understanding of the regulations and 
improve the efficiency of rule-making (Carolan, 2006; GAO, 2006; Neis et. al., 1999). In 
conjunction with increasing efficiency, more stakeholder communication, especially 
between fishermen and scientists, would help increase the faith stakeholders have in the 
data being used to develop fisheries management plans. Finally, an increase in 
communication between stakeholders and managers could help improve the level of 
social capital (GAO, 2006). 
Fisheries Management Implications 
Collaborative fisheries management may be the solution that SAFMC needs to 
help increase the implementation of catch share amendments. The ultimate goal of 
collaborative management is to create sound methods and techniques for data collection 
while involving the expertise of all the stakeholders involved (Kaplan & McCay, 2004). 
This goal can also be extended to include addressing what research techniques have 
failed and why, as well as seeking out new resources (Pilling & Payne, 2008). This will 
include all of the stakeholders discussed in this paper: fishermen, fisheries managers, 
government officials, industry workers, nonprofits, and natural and social scientists. 
Fishermen have a working knowledge of things like fish migration patterns, spawning 
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grounds, juvenile habitats, schooling behavior, habitat preferences, and morphological 
differences between different locations (Johnson & VanDensen, 2007). Along with 
fishermen, social scientists need to be involved from the beginning of the management 
process as well. Social scientists can help to create an understanding of how management 
practices are going to affect the local community. They also will be able to look at the 
social, economic, and cultural aspects of the community. If the knowledge social 
scientists gain is shared with the other stakeholders, particularly natural scientists, 
fisheries managers, and government officials, there will hopefully be an increase in 
understanding between the two groups which will help increase communication (Kaplan 
& McCay, 2004). Natural scientists need to be involved because fish stock assessments 
are inherently complex and challenging to understand fully. Fish stocks will often vary 
both spatially and temporally, and how they vary will change depending on the species of 
fish being investigated. Because of these natural variations in fish stocks, observations by 
fisherman often don’t match the scientific reports presented to fisheries managers. This is 
likely the cause of the great amount of distrust between fishermen, scientists, and 
managers. This distrust will ultimately cause a breakdown in fisheries’ management 
because the fisherman will put substantial pressure on the fishery managers who will 
likely succumb to the pressure and begin overlooking and not implementing regulations 
leading to overfishing (Johnson & VanDensen, 2007). Snapper Grouper Amendment 21 
is a great example of this process. Theoretically, collaborative management will increase 
communication between stakeholder groups which will in turn increase trust, preventing 
the above scenario from happening repeatedly (Kaplan & McCay, 2004). 
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 Specifically, cooperative research initiatives might greatly improve stakeholder 
relationships and improve upon the common stakeholder perception that the scientific 
methodology and resulting data being used to implement fisheries’ management plans are 
incorrect. Joint research initiatives include such practices as government scientists using 
fishing vessels and their crews to conduct fish stock assessments as well as conducting 
side-by-side research with fisherman. There are two major benefits of cooperative 
research. The first is that it will increase the trust between fisherman and scientists. 
Fisherman being able to contribute to the research and to use their expertise as well as 
have a say in the data collection techniques used to assess the fish stocks will increase 
their faith in the scientific data that is used to create regulations. This increase in faith 
will ultimately increase compliance and maybe even support for fishing regulations. The 
second benefit of cooperative research is that it makes the research techniques used very 
transparent and put them under intense scrutiny, especially from fisherman. Ultimately, 
this will result in better data collection techniques, which will allow for more reliable fish 
stock assessments, which will lead to better regulations and better marine policies 
(Kaplan & McCay, 2004). 
 There are, however, limitations to the theory of collaborative management and 
institutions that would need to be set up, primarily by the government, to help facilitate 
the management process. There are currently no specific rules or regulations or any type 
of governing body that makes a decision on representation in collaborative management. 
With no clear way of choosing representatives and no body that makes a final decision on 
representation, there are bound to be disagreements. Most commonly, this will lead to 
fisherman feeling as though they are not getting enough representation in the 
44 
 
management process or that their opinions and expertise are not being taken into account 
by the rest of the stakeholders. These feelings, whether they are justified or simply 
imagined based on perceptions of stakeholders, have the potential to hinder the 
management process. They will result in poor communication among stakeholders, will 
decrease morale and trust, and ultimately will lead to poor progress in managing the 
fisheries (Kaplan & McCay, 2004). 
This can already be seen in the SAFMC. While the numerous committees 
typically include a wide range of stakeholders including fishermen, nonprofits and 
government officials, there are still stakeholders who feel they are being 
underrepresented or other are being overrepresented. For example, fishermen have voiced 
the concern that nonprofit organizations such as EDF and the Pew Environmental Group 
are being overrepresented when discussing catch share amendment decisions. Another 
example is that recreational fishermen feel that commercial fishermen carry more weight 
in the Council than is appropriate. Addressing the relationship issues between stakeholder 
groups will be the first step SAFMC will have to take to implement collaborative 
management and, more importantly, collaborative research methods 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 The goal of this thesis was to identify what the biggest concerns stakeholders held 
about catch shares and how those concerns differed between stakeholder groups. Results 
showed that those with a financial stake in the industry were typically against catch share 
programs, whereas nonprofits were typically in favor of catch share programs. Themes 
being discussed did not vary significantly between stakeholder groups, indicating 
confusion over the possible costs and benefits of catch share programs. These results 
could have implications for how the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council should 
go about implementing catch share programs. It was recommended that the Council part-
take in more collaborative management, particularly in the form of joint-research 
initiatives. 
However, this thesis was not without shortcomings. Keyword analyses are 
inherently challenging. It is possible that the keyword analysis missed key themes that 
should have been identified as an important part of the analysis. Also, thematic analyses 
have the negative aspect of being too broad. While the five key themes and resulting 
subthemes attempted to investigate thoroughly the opinions of the stakeholder groups, it 
is likely that there were some important subtleties that were missed.  
As a result, this topic would benefit greatly from continued research, especially 
through more direct means of communication with stakeholders such as surveys and even 
better, interviews. This type of research would be able to pick up important factors that 
this thematic analysis may have missed. For example, this research also indicated the 
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importance of specific aspects of traditional management and catch share management 
such as a preference for bag and gear limits over catch shares or concerns about the 
appeals process or cost recovery plans involved with catch share programs. While this 
research study simply identified their importance, a more in-depth research study would 
be able to identify the specific actions and alternatives that were affecting the perceptions 
stakeholders had concerning catch shares. Understanding these key points could help 
managers write policies in a way that would appeal more to stakeholders. 
Finally, a next step after this research could be to compare the South Atlantic 
Fishery Management Council’s attempts to implement catch share programs to other 
councils’ attempts, such as the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council’s efforts. 
This could provide valuable insight into how stakeholder opinions vary between the two 
councils as well as how the process of implementing catch share amendments differs. 
Overall, this study has shown the importance of the economy, scientific data, and 
relationships to stakeholders in the South Atlantic region. It is argued that improving 
communication between stakeholders via methods such as increased collaborative 
management and implementation of collaborative research initiatives is necessary to 
increase the success of proposed catch share amendments 
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Appendix B. Summary of Amendment Actions and Alternatives 
 
Table 3. Actions and alternatives for Amendment 20A to the Snapper Grouper FMP (Wreckfish). For more information see: 
South Atlantic Fishery Management Council. (2011). Amendment 20A to the Fishery Management Plan for the Snapper Grouper 
Fishery of the South Atlantic Region with Environmental Assessment, Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis, Regulatory Impact Review, 
and Fishery Impact Statement. Retrieved from SAFMC website: www.safmc.net. 
Action Alternative One Alternative 
Two 
Alternative 
Three 
Alternative 
Four 
Alternative Five Alternative Six 
One: Define and 
revert inactive 
shares. 
No Action. Do not 
define or revert 
inactive shares for 
redistribution. 
Define inactive shares 
as shares belonging to 
any ITQ shareholder 
who has not reported 
wreckfish landings 
between April 16, 
2009, and January 14, 
2011, and revert 
inactive shares for 
redistribution among 
active shareholders. 
Define inactive shares 
as shares belonging to 
any ITQ shareholder 
who has not reported 
wreckfish landings 
between April 16, 
2006, and January 14, 
2011, and revert 
inactive shares for 
redistribution among 
active shareholders. 
N/A N/A N/A 
Two: 
Redistribution 
No Action. Do not 
redistribute reverted 
shares. 
Redistribute reverted 
shares to remaining 
shareholders based on 
50% equal allocation + 
50% landings history. 
Redistribute reverted 
shares to remaining 
shareholders based on 
landings history. 
Redistribute reverted 
shares based on 
proportion of 
remaining shares held 
by each remaining 
shareholder after 
inactive shares are 
reverted. 
N/A N/A 
Three: Share 
Cap 
No Action. Do not 
establish a share cap. 
Establish a share cap 
as 15% of the total 
shares. 
Establish a share cap 
as 25% of the total 
shares. 
Establish a share cap 
as 49% of the total 
shares. 
Establish a share cap 
as 65% of the total 
shares. 
Establish a share cap 
as the percentage of 
total shares held by the 
largest shareholder 
after redistribution. 
Four: Appeals 
Process 
No Action. Do not 
specify provisions for 
an appeals process 
associated with the 
ITQ program. 
A percentage of the 
wreckfish shares for 
fishing year will be 
set-aside to resolve 
appeals. 
A percentage of the 
wreckfish shares for 
fishing year will be 
set-aside to resolve 
appeals.  
N/A N/A N/A 
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Table 4. Actions and alternatives for Amendment 21 to the Snapper Grouper FMP. For more information see: South Atlantic 
Fishery Management Council. (2011). Scoping document for Amendment 21 to the fishery management plan for the Snapper Grouper 
Fishery of the South Atlantic region. Retrieved from SAFMC website: www.safmc.net. 
Action Alternative 
One 
Alternative 
Two 
Alternative 
Three 
Alternative 
Four 
Alternative 
Five 
Alternative 
Six 
Alternative 
Seven 
One: Selection 
of an effort 
management. 
No action. Do not 
change 
management 
regime of one or 
more snapper 
grouper 
species. 
Establish trip limits 
for one or more 
snapper grouper 
species. 
Establish an 
endorsement 
program for one or 
snapper grouper 
species. 
Establish quotas for 
the snapper grouper 
fishery. 
Implement rules for 
establishing 
cooperatives for 
one or more 
snapper grouper 
species. 
Establish TURFs 
for one or more 
snapper grouper 
species. 
Establish catch 
share program for 
one or more 
snapper grouper 
species. 
Two: 
Selection of 
species. 
No action—Do not 
establish LAP 
programs for 
snapper grouper 
species in the 
South Atlantic. 
Establish a LAP 
program for one or 
more species. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Three: 
Establish trip 
limits. 
No Action. Do not 
establish trip limits. 
Establish trip limits 
for one or more 
snapper grouper 
species. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Four: Initial 
allocation of 
endorsements. 
No action. Do not 
allocate 
endorsements. 
Allocate 
endorsements 
based on average 
annual landings 
during the 
qualifying 
years for all 
snapper grouper 
stocks of a certain 
poundage. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Five: 
Establish 
state-by-state 
quotas. 
No action. Do not 
establish state-by-
state quotas. 
Establish state-by-
state quotas using 
historical landings 
data. 
 
 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Six: Establish 
regional 
quotas. 
Do not establish 
regional quotas. 
Establish regional 
quotas for NC-SC, 
GA-northern 
Florida, and 
southern Florida 
Establish regional 
quotas for NC, SC-
GA, northern 
Florida, and 
southern Florida 
Establish regional 
quotas for NC, SC, 
GA-northern 
Florida, and 
southern Florida 
Establish regional 
quotas for NC, SC-
GA, Florida north 
and south of 
Monroe/Dade line. 
N/A N/A 
Seven: Set 
aside for 
research. 
No action. Do not 
set aside annual 
pounds for research 
or an experimental 
fishery. 
Set aside a total of 
X percent of the 
current commercial 
quota for a share 
category 
for research or an 
experimental 
fishery. 
Set aside a total of 
Y percent of the 
current commercial 
quota for a share 
category 
would be set aside 
to for research or 
an experimental 
fishery. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Eight: Catch 
share 
participation. 
Do not establish 
criteria for 
participating in a 
catch share 
program for 
South Atlantic 
snapper-grouper 
species. 
Participation would 
be mandatory for 
fishermen 
harvesting catch 
share managed 
species. 
Participation would 
be mandatory for 
fishermen 
harvesting catch 
share managed 
species if a 
majority of eligible 
fishermen approve 
implementation of 
the catch share 
program 
through 
referendum. 
4: Initial 
participation would 
be voluntary for 
fishermen 
harvesting catch 
share 
managed species. 
Prior to the start of 
the catch share 
program, fishermen 
could decide 
whether 
or not they would 
like to participate 
in the catch share 
program. 
N/A N/A N/A 
Action Nine: 
Define 
participants. 
No action. Do not 
identify substantial 
participants. 
Identify 
commercial 
snapper grouper 
permit holders as 
substantial 
participants 
Identify 
commercial 
snapper-grouper 
permit holders, 
vessel owners, 
captains, and 
crew as substantial 
participants. 
 
Identify U.S. 
citizens and U.S. 
permanent resident 
aliens as substantial 
participants. 
N/A N/A N/A 
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Ten: 
Eligibility. 
No action. Do not 
specify initial 
allocation 
eligibility 
requirements. 
Restrict eligibility 
to valid 
commercial 
snapper grouper 
permit holders. 
Restrict eligibility 
to valid 
commercial 
snapper grouper 
permit holders and 
snapper grouper 
captains and crew. 
Restrict eligibility 
to valid 
commercial 
snapper grouper 
permit holders and 
federally permitted 
snapper grouper 
dealers. 
Restrict eligibility 
to valid 
commercial 
snapper grouper 
permit holders, 
permitted 
snapper grouper 
dealers and snapper 
grouper captains 
and crew members. 
 
Restrict eligibility 
to based on a 
minimum 
percentage of the 
quota shares. 
Restrict eligibility 
based on catch 
history. 
Eleven: Initial 
apportionment. 
No action. Do not 
specify a method 
for the initial 
allocation of LAPs. 
Distribute shares 
proportionately 
among eligible 
participants of a 
catch share 
program based on 
average annual 
landings from 
logbooks 
associated with 
current snapper 
grouper permits 
during a particular 
time period 
Distribute catch 
shares 
proportionately 
among eligible 
participants based 
on 
average annual 
landings from 
logbooks 
associated with 
current snapper 
grouper limited 
access 
permit holders 
during the time 
period with an 
allowance of 
dropping one year. 
Distribute X% of 
catch shares 
equally among 
eligible participants 
and distribute 
the remaining X% 
of catch shares 
based on average 
annual landings 
from logbooks 
associated 
with current 
snapper grouper 
limited access 
permit holders 
during the time 
period 1998 to 
2005, 
with an allowance 
of dropping one 
year. 
Distribute catch 
shares through an 
auction system. All 
eligible entities 
under 
Action 3 would be 
allowed to place 
bids. 
Distribute initial 
allocation using 
tiers 
N/A 
Twelve: 
Multiuse trip 
allowance. 
Do not establish 
multiuse annual 
pounds or trip 
allowances. 
Establish multiuse 
annual pounds or 
trip allowances. 
N/A 
 
 
 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Thirteen: 
Transferability 
of shares and 
annual 
pounds. 
No action. Do not 
allow 
transferability of 
shares. 
Allow shares to be 
transferred between 
owners of snapper 
grouper permits. 
Allow shares to be 
transferred between 
persons identified 
as substantial 
participants. 
Allow shares to be 
transferred between 
unlimited 
commercial 
snapper grouper 
permit holders. 
Quota share would 
be reallocated to 
new entrants when 
a permit holder 
passes 
away. 
Allow shares to be 
transferred between 
unlimited 
commercial  
permit holders. 
Quota share would 
be reallocated to 
unlimited quota 
shareholders 
when a permit 
holder passes 
away. 
Allow shares to be 
transferred between 
unlimited 
commercial  
permit holders. 
Quota share would 
be reallocated to 
unlimited quota 
holders and new 
entrants when a 
permit holder 
passes away. 
 
Fourteen: 
Transferability 
of annual 
pounds. 
No action. Do not 
allow 
transferability of 
annual pounds. 
Allow annual 
pounds to be 
transferred between 
owners of snapper 
grouper 
permits. 
Allow annual 
pounds to be 
transferred between 
owners of snapper 
grouper 
unlimited permits. 
Allow pounds to be 
transferred between 
substantial 
participants. 
N/A N/A N/A 
Fifteen: 
Establish caps 
on shares 
ownership. 
No action. Do not 
establish ownership 
caps for each 
species or species 
grouping. 
Establish a cap on 
share ownership. 
Anyone receiving 
shares that were 
less than 
the share cap could 
purchase additional 
shares up to that 
amount of the share 
cap. 
No person shall 
own more catch 
shares than the 
maximum 
percentage issued 
to 
the recipient of the 
largest amount of 
shares at the time 
of initial 
assignment of 
shares for a share 
category. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Sixteen: 
Establish caps 
on pounds 
ownership. 
No action. Do not 
establish a cap on 
catch share annual 
pounds ownership. 
For each species, 
establish a cap on 
the annual pounds 
corresponding to 
the share cap as 
defined in Action 
10, times 
commercial quota. 
No person shall 
possess more than 
the maximum 
pounds 
issued to the 
recipient of the 
largest amount of 
pounds at the time 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Seventeen: 
Adjustment of 
annual 
pounds. 
No action. Do not 
specify how annual 
pounds are 
allocated when 
there is a 
change in the 
commercial quota. 
Distribute annual 
pounds 
proportionally 
among 
shareholders, made 
available due 
to an increase or 
decrease in 
commercial quota 
based on share 
holding. 
Distribute annual 
pounds equally 
among 
shareholders, made 
available due to 
and 
increase or 
decrease in 
commercial quota. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Eighteen: 
Incidental 
catch 
provisions. 
No action. Do not 
allow incidental 
catch amounts for 
snapper grouper 
species for 
fishermen who do 
not hold shares. 
Allow incidental 
catch amounts for a 
snapper grouper 
species for 
fishermen 
who do not hold 
share. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Nineteen: 
Allow 
banking. 
No action. Do not 
allow catch share 
holders to bank 
unused amounts of  
pounds or X 
percentage of 
unused annual 
pounds for use in 
the subsequent 
year. 
Allow banking of 
unused amounts of 
annual pounds for 
use in the 
subsequent 
fishing year. 
Allow banking of 
unused amounts of 
annual pounds for 
use in the 
subsequent 
fishing year. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Twenty: 
Allow 
borrowing. 
No action. Do not 
allow borrowing of 
any future year’s 
annual pounds. 
Allow shareholders 
limited borrowing 
of a subsequent 
year’s pounds. 
After exhausting an 
individual’s annual 
pounds, the 
shareholder is 
allowed to borrow  
pounds from the 
following year. 
Allow shareholders 
to borrow up to 10 
percent of 
remaining 
allocation on the 
last 
trip of the year. 
The overage is 
taken off next 
year’s allocation. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
58 
 
 
Table 4. Actions and alternatives for Amendment 21 to the Snapper Grouper FMP. 
Twenty One: 
Appeals 
process. 
No action. Do not 
establish an appeals 
process for 
fishermen who 
believes they 
were omitted from 
the catch share 
program or not 
been allocated the 
correct amount of 
shares 
based on eligibility 
criteria described 
for a catch share 
category. 
Establish an 
appeals process. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Twenty Two: 
Set aside for 
appeals. 
No action. Do not 
set aside a portion 
of the commercial 
quota for appeals. 
Set aside a total of 
X percent of the 
current commercial 
quota 
to resolve appeals. 
Set aside a total of 
Y percent of the 
current commercial 
quota 
to resolve appeals. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Twenty Three: 
Use it or lose 
it. 
No action. Do not 
specify a minimum 
landings 
requirement for 
retaining catch 
shares 
Revoke shares that 
remain inactive for 
three years and 
redistribute them 
proportionally 
among remaining 
shareholders 
(30%). 
Revoke shares that 
remain inactive for 
three years and 
redistribute them 
proportionally 
among remaining 
shareholders 
(50%). 
Revoke shares that 
remain inactive for 
X years and 
redistribute them 
proportionally 
among remaining 
shareholders (A%). 
Revoke shares that 
remain inactive for 
Y years and 
redistribute them 
proportionally 
among remaining 
shareholders (A%). 
Revoke shares that 
remain inactive for 
X years and 
redistribute them 
proportionally 
among remaining 
shareholders (B%). 
Revoke shares that 
remain inactive for 
Y years and 
redistribute them 
proportionally 
among remaining 
shareholders (B%). 
Twenty Four: 
Cost recovery 
plan. 
No action. Do not 
establish a cost 
recovery plan. 
Implement catch 
share cost recovery 
plans for catch 
share categories. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Twenty Five: 
Collection of 
royalties. 
No action. Do not 
collect royalties 
from shareholders 
for use in the 
snapper 
grouper fishery. 
Hold an annual 
auction of portions 
of the shares in the 
snapper grouper 
fishery. 
 
Collect royalties 
from shareholders 
through an annual 
fee. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Twenty Six: 
New entrants 
loan program. 
No action. Do not 
create a loan 
program to assist 
new fishermen in 
entering a 
catch share 
program. 
Set aside X % of 
the commercial 
quota each year to 
give some  
permit holders that 
did not receive 
shares the 
opportunity to 
become 
shareholders. 
Set aside X % of 
the commercial 
quota each year to 
give some 
fishermen that did 
not receive shares 
the opportunity to 
become 
shareholders. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Twenty 
Seven: 
Approved 
landing sites. 
No action. Do not 
establish approved 
landing sites for 
catch share 
managed 
snapper-grouper 
species. 
Establish approved 
landing sites. All 
catch share owners 
must land at one of 
these 
sites to participate 
in the catch share 
program. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Twenty Eight: 
Expiration 
provision. 
No action. Do not 
define an 
expiration 
provision for the 
catch share 
program(s). 
Define shares so 
they expire every 5 
years with a start 
date upon 
implementation 
of this 
Amendment. 
 
Define shares so 
they expire every 
10 years with a 
start date upon 
implementation 
of this 
Amendment. 
Define shares so 
they expire every X 
number of years 
with a start date 
upon 
implementation of 
this Amendment. 
N/A N/A N/A 
Twenty Nine: 
VMS 
Requirement 
No action. Do not 
require commercial 
snapper grouper 
vessels to be 
equipped with 
vessel monitoring 
systems (VMS). 
Require all 
commercial vessels 
to be equipped with 
VMS. The 
purchase, 
installation and 
maintenance of 
VMS equipment 
must conform to 
the protocol 
established by 
NOAA Fisheries 
Service. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Table 5. Actions and alternatives for Amendment 6 to the Golden Crab FMP. For more information see: South Atlantic Fisheries 
Management Council.  (2012). Amendment 6 to the Fishery Management Plan for the Gold Crab Fishery of the South Atlantic 
Region. Retrieved from SAFMC website: www.safmc.net. 
Action Alternative 
One 
Alternative 
Two 
Alternative 
Three 
Alternative 
Four 
Alternative 
Five 
Alternative 
Six 
Alternative 
Seven 
One: Establish 
eligibility. 
Do not establish 
eligibility criteria 
for a golden crab 
catch share 
program 
Restrict eligibility 
to valid or 
renewable 
commercial golden 
crab permit holders 
who have made 
landings of 1 
pound or greater 
from 2001 through 
2010. 
Restrict eligibility 
to valid or 
renewable 
commercial golden 
crab permit holders 
who have made 
landings of 1 
pound or greater 
from 2005 through 
2010. 
Restrict eligibility 
to valid or 
renewable 
commercial golden 
crab permit 
holders. 
N/A N/A N/A 
Action Two: 
Apportionment. 
Do not specify a 
method for initial 
apportionment of 
catch shares. 
Distribute initial 
catch shares 
proportionately 
among eligible 
participants based 
on the aggregate 
annual golden crab 
landings from 
logbooks 
associated with 
their current 
permit(s) during 
the time period 
2002 through 2010. 
Distribute initial 
catch shares 
proportionately 
among eligible 
participants based 
on the aggregate 
annual golden crab 
landings from 
logbooks 
associated with 
their current 
permit(s) during 
the time period 
1997 through 2010. 
Distribute 50% of 
initial catch shares 
equally among 
eligible 
participants and 
distribute 50% of 
initial catch shares 
among eligible 
participants based 
on the aggregate 
annual golden crab 
landings from 
logbooks 
associated with 
their current 
permit(s) during 
the time period 
1997 through 2010 
Distribute 25% of 
initial catch shares 
equally among 
eligible 
participants and 
distribute 75% of 
initial catch shares 
among eligible 
participants based 
on the aggregate 
annual golden crab 
landings from 
logbooks 
associated with 
their current 
permit(s) during 
the time period 
1997 through 2010 
Distribute initial 
catch shares 
proportionately 
among eligible 
participants based 
on the best 
consecutive three 
year average of 
golden crab 
logbook landings 
associated with 
their current 
permit(s) during 
the time period 
1997 through 2010 
Distribute initial 
apportionment of 
catch shares 
through an auction. 
All eligible entities 
as determined in 
Action 1 would be 
able to participate. 
Three: Appeals 
process. 
Do not specify 
provisions for an 
appeals process. 
A % of the shares 
for the fishing year 
will be set-aside 
for appeals. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Four: 
Transferability. 
Do not establish 
criteria for 
transferability. 
Shares or annual 
pounds can only be 
transferred to valid or 
renewable golden crab 
permit holders. 
Participants cannot 
possess shares or 
allocation without a 
valid or renewable 
golden crab permit. 
Shares or annual 
pounds can only be 
transferred to valid 
and renewable golden 
crab permit holders 
during the first five 
years of the catch 
share program and all 
U.S. citizens and 
permanent resident 
aliens thereafter. 
Participants cannot 
possess shares or 
allocation without a 
valid or renewable 
golden crab permit. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Five: Share 
ownership caps. 
Do not constrain the 
percentage of catch 
shares held by a 
person, including a 
corporation or other 
entity. 
No person, including a 
corporation or other 
entity, may 
individually or 
collectively hold catch 
shares in excess of the 
maximum share 
initially issued to any 
person at the 
beginning of the catch 
shares program. 
No person, including a 
corporation or other 
entity, may 
individually or 
collectively hold catch 
shares in excess of 25 
percent of the total 
shares. 
No person, 
including a 
corporation or other 
entity, may 
individually or 
collectively hold 
catch shares in 
excess of 35 
percent of the total 
shares. 
No person, 
including a 
corporation 
or other 
entity, may 
individually 
or 
collectively 
hold catch 
shares in 
excess of 
49 percent 
of the total 
shares. 
N/A N/A 
Six: Use it or 
lose it policy. 
Do not specify a 
minimum landings 
requirement for 
retaining shares. 
Shares that remain 
inactive for 3 
consecutive years will 
be revoked and 
redistributed 
proportionally among 
the remaining 
shareholders 
Shares that remain 
inactive for 3 
consecutive years will 
be revoked and 
redistributed 
proportionally among 
the remaining 
shareholders. 
Shares that remain 
inactive for 3 
consecutive years 
will be revoked and 
redistributed among 
the remaining 
shareholders. 
 
N/A N/A N/A 
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Seven: Cost 
recovery plan. 
Do not implement a 
cost recovery plan. 
Cost recovery fees 
would be calculated 
at time of sale at a 
registered dealer 
Fee collection and 
submission is the 
responsibility of a) 
shareholder b) dealer 
Fees submitted to 
NMFS 
N/A N/A N/A 
Eight: Revise 
boat length limit. 
No Action. To obtain 
a permit for the 
middle or southern 
zone via transfer, the 
documented length 
overall of the 
replacement vessel 
may not exceed the 
documented length 
overall, or aggregate 
documented lengths 
overall, of the 
replaced vessel(s) by 
more than 20 percent. 
Eliminate vessel 
length restrictions for 
obtaining a permit for 
the middle and 
southern zones via 
transfer. 
To obtain a permit for 
the middle or southern 
zone via transfer, the 
documented length 
overall of the 
replacement vessel 
may not exceed the 
documented length 
overall, or aggregate 
documented lengths 
overall, of the replaced 
vessel(s) by more than 
35 percent. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Nine: Modify 
regulation on 
fishing zones. 
No Action. A vessel 
with a permit to fish 
for golden crab in the 
northern zone or the 
middle zone may fish 
only in that zone. 
Participants can use 
annual pounds in any 
zone for which they 
possess a permit. 
A vessel with a permit 
to fish golden crab can 
use annual pounds in 
any of the three golden 
crab fishing zones. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Ten: Modify the 
small vessel sub-
zone restriction. 
No Action. Do not 
modify the small 
vessel sub-zone 
restriction. 
Eliminate the small 
vessel sub-zone within 
the southern zone that 
was originally 
established to protect 
against very large 
vessels fishing in the 
subzone 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Eleven: Modify 
‘one vessel, one 
permit’ policy. 
Do not modify “one 
vessel, one permit” 
policy for golden 
crab. 
Allow multiple 
permits to be issued to 
one vessel so that any 
zones can be fished in 
one trip. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Twelve: 
Monitoring and 
enforcement. 
Do not require 
additional 
monitoring and 
enforcement. 
Require all vessels 
engaged in the catch 
share program to be 
equipped with VMS. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Action Thirteen: 
Define 
ownership cap. 
Do not identify annual 
pound ownership caps 
Set the annual pounds 
cap equal to the 
corresponding share 
cap as defined in the 
“Define quota share 
ownership caps” 
action (Action 5) 
times the annual quota. 
Set the annual pounds 
cap equal to the share 
cap specified in Action 
5 plus a) 1% b) 5% c) 
10% 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Fourteen: Annual 
pounds overage. 
Do not allow 
fishermen to exceed 
their allotted annual 
pounds. 
A person on board a 
vessel with the 
shareholder’s only 
remaining golden crab 
annual pounds may 
exceed, by up to 10%, 
the shareholder’s 
annual pounds 
remaining on the last 
fishing trip of the year. 
A person on board a 
vessel with the 
shareholder’s only 
remaining golden crab 
annual pounds may 
exceed, by up to 20%, 
the shareholder’s 
annual pounds 
remaining on the last 
fishing trip of the year. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Fifteen: 
Approved 
landing sites. 
Do not establish 
approved landing sites 
for the golden crab 
catch share program. 
Establish approved 
landing sites for the 
golden crab catch 
share program. All 
participants must land 
at an approved landing 
site to participate in 
the program 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Appendix C. Summary of thematic analysis results. 
 
Table 6. Number of Golden Crab comments containing individual themes. 
* Percentages used for n > 10 (x%), counts used for n < 10 (x/n) 
 Environment  Economy   Science Stakeholders   Management  
 Biological Habitat Jobs Cost Tourism Data NPO 
Influence 
Fishermen Managers Traditional Catch 
Shares 
Fishermen 
Against (4) 
2/4 1/4 3/4 3/4 0 0 1/4 0 1/4 1/4 3/4 
Fishermen 
For (3) 
1/3 2/3 2/3 1/3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2/3 
Government 
Against (1) 
0 0 1/1 0 1/1 0 0 0 0 1/1 0 
Managers 
For (3) 
2/3 2/3 0 2/3 0 1/3 0 0 0 1/3 0 
NPOs 
Against (22) 
86 0 86. 0 27 77 5 59 95 68 100 
NPOs For 
(1024) 
100 0.2 99 0.29 99 0 0.1 0 100 0 100 
            
 
Table 7. Number of Snapper Grouper comments containing individual themes. 
* Percentages used for n > 10 (x%), counts used for n < 10 (x/n) 
 Environment  Economy   Science Stakeholders   Management  
 Biological Habitat Jobs Cost Tourism Data NPO Influence Fishermen Managers Traditional Catch 
Shares 
Fishermen 
Against (1159) 
93 7 94 93 12 93 2 94 8 10 95 
Fishermen For 
(13) 
8 0 15 8 0 23 0 15 0 8 23 
Government 
For (1) 
0 0 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 0 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 
Industry 
Against (40) 
63 15 76 65 40 73 0 58 20 83 85 
Industry  
For (1) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/1 
Managers 
Against (2) 
2/2 1/2 1/2 2/2 1/2 2/2 1/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 
NPOs  
Against (61) 
74 7 72 5 23 67 8 55 79 59 87 
NPOs For 
(2277) 
100 0.36 99 0.5 99 0.27 0.18 0.14 100 0.23 100 
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Table 8. Number of Wreckfish comments containing individual themes. 
* Percentages used for n > 10 (x%), counts used for n < 10 (x/n) 
 Environment  Economy   Science Stakeholders   Management  
 Biological Habitat Jobs Cost Tourism Data NPO 
Influence 
Fishermen Managers Traditional Catch 
Shares 
Fishermen 
Against (1) 
1/1 0 1/1 0 0 1/1 0 0 1/1 0 1/1 
Industry For 
(2) 
0 0 1/2 0 0 1/2 0 0 1/2 0 1/2 
NPO Against 
(1) 
0 1/1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/1 1/1 
NPO For (2) 0 1/2 2/2 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 2/2 2/2 
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